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—  Comment  — 
The Wall that AEDPA Built: 
Revisiting the Suspension  
Clause Challenge to the  
Antiterrorism and Effective  
Death Penalty Act 
“We are all broken by something. We have all hurt someone and 
have been hurt. We all share the condition of brokenness even if 
our brokenness is not equivalent . . . . We’ve submitted to the 
harsh instinct to crush those among us whose brokenness is most 
visible. But simply punishing the broken—walking away from them 
or hiding them from sight—only ensures that they remain broken 
and we do, too. There is no wholeness outside of our reciprocal 
humanity.”1 
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Introduction 
For more than four centuries, the writ of habeas corpus has been 
the primary vehicle for “oppressed and distressed prisoners” to stake 
their claims to righteousness and to unmask government misconduct.2 
The framers recognized the importance of protecting oppressed prison-
ers by ensuring that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended.”3 But the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act4 (AEDPA) has built a virtually impenetrable wall of isolation 
around these prisoners, silencing their grievances and leaving them 
powerless against state abuses. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
AEDPA’s Section 2254(d)(1) bars habeas petitioners from obtaining 
federal postconviction relief for any claims decided in state court, unless 
the petitioner can show that the state court decision is irrational—a 
standard that has proven almost impossible to meet.  
Celebrating its twentieth anniversary this year, AEDPA might 
finally be ready to fall. Federal judges of varying political persuasions 
have begun to publicly voice their disapproval of AEDPA and question 
its constitutionality, some calling it one of the “greater wrongs of our 
legal era.”5 While it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would find that  
2. See Paul D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire 
1 (2010) (quoting John Lilburne, The Prisoner’s Most Mournful 
Cry 3 (1648)); Noam Biale, Beyond a Reasonable Disagreement: Judging 
Habeas Corpus, 83 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1337, 1344 (2015) (explaining that the 
writ developed under English common law “as a mechanism for ensuring 
compliance with the King’s laws”). 
3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
4. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.). 
5. Hon. Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise 
of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the  
Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly 
Unfortunate Consequences, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 1219, 1219, 1224 (2015) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of AEDPA has “troubling 
constitutional implications”); see also Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 
44 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. iii, xlii (2015) (“AEDPA is a cruel, 
unjust and unnecessary law that effectively removes federal judges as safe-
guards against miscarriages of justice. It has resulted and continues to result 
in much human suffering. It should be repealed.”); Hon. Gregory M. Sleet, 
The Execution of Shannon Johnson: A Subversion of Due Process and the 
Adversarial System?, 30 A.B.A.J. Crim. Just. 9, 10 (2015) (“[W]hile it is 
impossible to remedy any possible constitutional infirmity in Johnson’s case, 
it seems to me that it is incumbent upon us as participants in the legal process 
at issue, especially those of us at the very heartbeat of that process, to con-
tinuously evaluate whether that process has functioned consistent with 
both our notions of due process and societal precepts of what is or is not fair.”); 
Marcia Coyle, Sotomayor Says Congress Should Not Tell Judges How to 
Review Cases, The Nat’l L.J. (November 19, 2015), http://www. 
nationallawjournal.com/id=1202742882533/Sotomayor-Says-Congress-
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its own statutory interpretation violates the Constitution, a well-argued 
Suspension Clause challenge can expose AEDPA’s friction with import-
ant legal principles and may pressure Congress to take action.6 This 
Comment provides such an argument. 
Part I gives background on AEDPA, points out what Section 
2254(d)(1) does, explains why AEDPA’s standard of review is problem-
atic, and introduces the Suspension Clause challenge. Part II describes 
the writ of habeas corpus at common law and observes that there are 
two versions of habeas’s history, a narrow version and a functionalist 
version. The functionalist approach is essential to a strong attack on 
AEDPA. Part III introduces the age-old debate over the writ’s constitu-
tional scope. To formulate the best Suspension Clause challenge to Sec-
tion 2254(d)(1), a challenger should argue that: (1) the Suspension 
Clause impliedly guarantees a right, or entitlement, to the writ of ha-
beas corpus that Congress cannot take away; (2) that right includes 
meaningful review of a petitioner’s federal claims; and (3) that right 
also includes some federal review. 
Part IV argues that the Court’s interpretation of Section 
2254(d)(1) does not merely make it more difficult for petitioners to 
successfully obtain the writ; it builds a wall that renders petitioners 
voiceless, courts powerless, and justice a nullity. This Part focuses on 
three pieces of AEDPA’s standard of review and argues that each of 
these pieces adds significant barriers to substantive postconviction re-
view. Collectively, they form the suspension wall: (1) all claims “adjud-
icated on the merits” in state court receive deference; (2) that deference 
requires petitioners to show that the state court decision was “contrary 
to or an unreasonable application of” federal law, perhaps the most 
deferential standard in all of Supreme Court jurisprudence; (3) the fed-
eral law applied in the state court must be “clearly established, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Part V then dis-
cusses the early Suspension Clause challenges in the circuit courts and  
Should-Not-Tell-Judges-How-to-Review-Cases?slreturn=20160109093344 
[https://perma.cc/SM45-WYW4] (“[J]udicial independence is compromised 
when Congress decides with details what the standards [of review] should be.”).  
6. The Court is unlikely to hold that its interpretation of AEDPA violates the 
Suspension Clause for three practical reasons. First, it interpreted AEDPA 
“in the most inflexible and unyielding manner possible” by choice, not oblig-
ation. Reinhardt, supra note 5, at 1221, 1225–29. Second, the Court frequently 
chides lower courts that grant habeas petitions as if it were “scold[ing] a 
naughty child.” Ursula Bentele, The Not So Great Writ: Constitution Lite 
for State Prisoners, 5 U. Denv. Crim. L. Rev. 34, 36 (2015). Third, the Court 
avoids deciding constitutional issues, unless necessary. See Burton v. United 
States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905) (“It is not the habit of the court to decide 
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision 
of the case.”). However, the Suspension Clause challenge has persuasive value 
because constitutional challenges can garner attention and add much-needed 
political pressure. 
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distinguishes the reasoning in those cases from AEDPA’s current 
suspension wall. With the recent surge in scholarship calling for radical 
reform to AEDPA,7 the time is ripe to strike with a strong challenge 
that can awaken the public to the need for change. 
I. AEDPA Background and the Problems AEDPA Poses 
After the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings stunned the nation,8 Cong-
ress took advantage of its opportunity to reform the writ of habeas 
corpus by enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.9 
Seemingly “semi-obscure,”10 AEDPA was “the most significant habeas 
reform” since the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.11 Since its enactment, 
however, “AEDPA has proven to be as confusing as it is controver-
sial.”12 Among its changes, AEDPA added a number of daunting proce-
dural hurdles for habeas petitioners, including a tighter exhaustion 
 
7. See Samuel R. Wiseman, What is Federal Habeas Worth?, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 
1157 (2015) (proposing that resources be focused on actual innocence cases); 
Eve Brensike Primus, A Crisis in Federal Habeas Law, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 
887 (2012) (arguing that King and Hoffman should expand their concept of 
federal intervention in state criminal processes); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging 
the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 85 
(2012) (disagreeing with King and Hoffman that federal habeas review should 
be tossed out and, instead, proposing increased federal review over state pro-
cesses and decreased federal review over state results); Nancy J. King & 
Joseph L. Hoffman, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century (2011) 
(criticizing the current habeas system for its costliness and ineffectiveness 
and proposing plans to reform state criminal justice systems). 
8. See 142 Cong. Rec. H3614 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Pelosi) 
(noting that the Oklahoma City bombing was the force pushing the AEDPA). 
9. After signing the bill into law, President Clinton stated, “I have signed this 
bill because I am confident that the Federal courts will interpret these pro-
visions to preserve independent review of Federal legal claims and the bedrock 
constitutional principle of an independent judiciary.” Statement on Signing 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 32 Weekly Comp. 
Pres. Doc. 719, 720 (Apr. 24, 1996). 
10. Emily Bazelon, The Law that Keeps People on Death Row Despite Flawed 
Trials, N.Y. Times Mag., (July 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
07/17/magazine/the-law-that-keeps-people-on-death-row-despite-flawed-
trials.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ZF4M-F4MW]. 
11. Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: 
What’s Wrong with It and How to Fix It, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 919, 923 (2001) 
(explaining that much of Congress “wanted to ‘get tough on crime’” and that 
President Bill Clinton signed the bill into law “to avoid charges that he was 
‘soft’ on crime”). 
12. Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 953, 959 
(2012); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) (“[I]n a world of silk purses 
and pigs’ ears, the Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting.”). 
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requirement, a one-year statute of limitations, and a ban on “successive 
petitions.”13 
AEDPA’s “centerpiece,” Section 2254(d), alters the standard of 
review for federal courts reviewing habeas petitions.14 Before AEDPA, 
the Court conducted independent de novo review of a habeas petition-
er’s federal claims.15 But Section 2254(d)(1) provides that federal courts 
shall not issue petitions for the writ of habeas corpus for state-court 
judgments “adjudicated on the merits” unless the state-court judgment 
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.”16 This 
provision may not seem like much on its face, but it deals deadly blows 
to federal habeas petitions, even where courts know that a claim is 
meritorious.17 With this exacting standard, AEDPA “make[s] it as diff-
icult for habeas petitioners to succeed in pursuing the Writ as it would 
be for a Supreme Court Justice to strike out Babe Ruth, Joe DiMaggio, 
and Mickey Mantle in succession.”18 
Congress created this “difficult to meet” standard to advance final-
ity, federalism, and comity.19 Proponents of the AEDPA argue that 
 
13. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218–19 (1996). AEDPA also limited the circumstances 
under which a federal court may conduct an evidentiary hearing, id., further 
limited appellate review, § 102, and added requirements for the adjudication 
of capital cases, § 107. AEDPA’s procedural limitations are beyond the scope 
of this Comment. 
14. Daniel J. O’Brien, Heeding Congress’s Message: The United States Supreme 
Court Bars Federal Courthouse Doors to Habeas Relief Against All But 
Irrational State Court Decisions, and Oftentimes Doubly So, 24 Fed. Sent’g 
Rep. 320, 322 (2012). 
15. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 465, 506 (1953). 
16. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 104 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012)). Section 2254(d)(2) provides that federal 
courts may not grant the writ of habeas corpus for any cases adjudicated 
on the merits in state court unless the state court decision “was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 
in the State court proceeding.” Id. This provision, too, is beyond the scope of 
this Comment. 
17. Kozinski, supra note 5, at xli (“[Judges] now regularly have to stand by in 
impotent silence, even though it may appear to us that an innocent person 
has been convicted.”). 
18. Reinhardt, supra note 5, at 1220–21 (arguing that the Court’s conservative 
majority has “embarked on a path designed to render constitutional rulings 
by state courts nearly unreviewable by the federal judiciary”). 
19. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (“If this standard is difficult 
to meet, that is because it was meant to be.”). Finality refers to “the principle 
that the criminal process must have some end.” Barry Friedman, Failed Enter-
prise: The Supreme Court’s Habeas Reform, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 485, 489 (1995). 
“Federalism refers to the coordinate role of the states in both adjudicating 
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federal review of state convictions “frustrates ‘both the States sovereign 
power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor con-
stitutional rights.’”20 They further emphasize that swift punishment is 
“essential to the educational and deterrent functions of the criminal 
(justice system).”21 The federal postconviction habeas process unnecess-
arily promotes the “endless reopening of convictions”22 and the “floods 
of stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions [that] inundate the docket 
of the lower courts.”23 After a state invests time, effort, and money into 
a conviction, it feels disrespected when a federal court forces it to begin 
anew.24 
But AEDPA flirts with the line between the politically foolish and 
the unconstitutional. While costs certainly play a role in the adminis-
tration of criminal justice, AEDPA does not reduce caseloads; it does 
not streamline convictions; it does not trim expenses from habeas litig-
ation.25 Further, federal review of possible constitutional violations in 
state court proceedings is not an affront to federalism but rather an 
example of “the federal system . . . working as it should.”26 Moreover, 
 
guilt and innocence, and in addressing claims of constitutional violation.” Id. 
Comity, as an aspect of federalism, refers to the idea “that federal courts should 
respect the determinations of state courts regarding the adjudication of 
constitutional claims.” Id. 
20. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555–56 (1998) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 
477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986)). 
21. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963); see also Hon. J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 
1099, 1108–09 (2014) (arguing that some error is inevitable because every 
level of the criminal process involves “the judgment of people” and that states 
are confronted with the very real need to combat crime and make “tradeoffs”). 
22. Bator, supra note 21, at 452. 
23. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
24. Judith L. Ritter, The Voice of Reason—Why Recent Judicial Interpretations 
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s Restrictions on Habeas 
Corpus are Wrong, 37 Seattle U. L. Rev. 55, 76 (2013); see Naftali 
Bendavid, The Hangman Cometh, N.J. L. J., Dec. 30, 1996 (“It [is] about time 
we put a stop to the endless, frivolous appeals of justly imposed sentences.”). 
25. See Wiseman, supra note 7, at 1164–65 (estimating that the current habeas 
process costs $327 million per year); Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, 
Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
791 (2009) (criticizing the costliness and inefficiency of federal habeas review 
of state criminal cases); Nancy J. King, Fred L. Cheesman II & Brian J. 
Ostrom, Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District 
Courts 59 (2007) (analyzing the statistics of all federal habeas cases and 
explaining that the “[o]verall disposition time per case has increased on average 
since AEDPA”). 
26. Eric M. Freedman, State Post-Conviction Remedies in the Next Fifteen Years: 
How Synergy Between the State and Federal Governments Can Improve the 
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AEDPA’s valuation—finality over fairness—is short-sighted. These 
policies contribute to the cycle of mass incarceration, exacerbate the 
distrust of the criminal justice system in poor communities, and increase 
the likelihood of imprisoning innocent people for crimes they did not 
commit.27 At its root, AEDPA willfully ignores that the criminal justice 
system can escape this cyclicality only when it acknowledges that its 
primary role is to “preserve the integrity of society itself.”28 
More relevant here, AEDPA’s Section 2254(d)(1) creates unsettling 
friction with many constitutional principles.29 Habeas corpus speaks to 
the power of federal judges to review cases, the procedural rights of 
detainees and defendants, and other substantive individual rights of 
defendants throughout the criminal process. Accordingly, scholars and 
litigators have challenged Section 2254(d) on separation of powers 
grounds because it deprives federal judges of their duty to “say what 
the law is.”30 They have argued that Section 2254(d) violates defend-
ants’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rights to Due Process because 
it cheapens habeas postconviction procedures.31 And they have chall-
enged that it unconstitutionally suspends the writ because it prohibits 
 
Criminal Justice System Nationally, 24 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 298, 299 (2012) 
(explaining that federal review in habeas proceedings furthers efficiency and 
acts as a “double security” for the rights of the people) (quoting The Fed-
eralist No. 51, at 139 (James Madison) (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2003)). 
27. Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness 
to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 339, 
340–45 (2006) (explaining that the AEDPA exacerbates the United States’ 
incarceration rate, which is already the highest in the world, as well as the 
perception that the criminal justice system is “unfair, corrupt, biased, and 
error-plagued”). 
28. Sleet, supra note 5, at 9 (quoting Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized 
Adversary System, 1 Chap. L. Rev. 57, 61 (1998)). 
29. Kimberly Woolley, Note, Constitutional Interpretations of the Antiterrorism 
Act’s Habeas Corpus Provisions, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 414, 416 (1998) 
(arguing that the although “the AEDPA is unconstitutional,” constitutional 
challenges will likely fail “in light of the Supreme Court’s current composition”). 
30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see James S. Liebman 
& William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of 
Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 696, 696, 
864–84 (1998) (arguing that the interpretation of Section 2254(d)(1) (later 
adopted by the Court) violates the separation of powers because it deprives 
“the judicial Power” of its five core qualities: (1) deciding “the whole federal 
question, (2) independently and (3) finally, based on (4) the whole supreme 
law, and (5) impose a remedy that, in the process of binding the parties to 
the court’s judgment, effectuates supreme law and neutralizes contrary law”). 
31. See Justin F. Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken 
in § 2254 Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 Hastings L.J. 1, 6 (2010) 
(arguing that the AEDPA’s constraint of federal review constitutes a lack 
of due process). 
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defendants who were convicted in state courts from fully vindicating 
their constitutional rights.32 
Though each of these challenges failed in the lower federal courts 
shortly after AEDPA’s enactment,33 recent Supreme Court cases may 
have breathed life back into the Suspension Clause challenge, as Part 
IV discusses. Further, the Suspension Clause challenge is in the best 
position to reveal many of AEDPA’s problems. As Parts II and III 
argue, the Suspension Clause’s “very broad limits”34 and historical back-
ground can provide enough flexibility to utilize due process and 
separation-of-powers grievances. 
II. The Two Versions of Habeas Corpus  
“As It Existed in 1789” 
The writ of habeas corpus has long been celebrated as an indispen-
sable piece of American democracy, and any restrictions on the writ’s 
availability are met with the “immediate incantation of the Great 
Writ.”35 The Court reasons that the writ of habeas corpus as it existed 
in 1789 informs the constitutional scope of the writ as it exists now.36 
 
32. See Dan Poulson, Note, Suspension for Beginners: Ex Parte Bollman and the 
Unconstitutionality of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act, 35 Hastings Const. L.Q. 373, 374 (2008) (arguing that the AEDPA 
limits the availability of judicial review for state prisoners). 
33. See Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that AEDPA’s 
Section 2254(d) is not a violation of separation of powers and does not suspend 
the writ); Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 855 (9th Cir. 2007) (Noonan, J., 
concurring) (rejecting the argument that “habeas corpus today is a require-
ment of due process”); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that AEDPA’s Section 2254(d) is neither a suspension of the writ nor a due 
process violation). 
34. Schlup v. Delo 513 U.S. 298, 343 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
35. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 142–43 (1970) (arguing that innocence 
should be the primary concern in postconviction habeas cases and that such 
a restriction on the writ’s “current excesses” does not conflict with the writ’s 
true purpose). 
36. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384 (1977) (Burger, J., concurring) (“The 
sweep of the Suspension Clause must be measured by reference to the intention 
of the Framers and their understanding of what the writ of habeas corpus 
meant at the time the Constitution was drafted.”). But see Felker v. Turpin, 
518 U.S. 651, 663–664 (1996) (“But we assume, for purposes of decision here, 
that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution referes to the writ as it exists 
today, rather than as it existed in 1789.”).  
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But the robustness of the early writ has long been debated.37 The fram-
ers’ understanding of the writ was undoubtedly influenced by English 
Common Law, which relied a great deal on the writ.38 Many scholars 
credit Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta with first mentioning the writ, 
though its true origins date back even further.39 Most scholars agree 
that the writ occasionally expanded and contracted throughout history 
in England and in the United States.40 But the unchanging, outermost 
boundaries of the writ are less clear, and the breadth of habeas review 
available today depends, in part, on the version of history offered to 
support that review.41 
Judges, scholars, and attorneys primarily endorse two descriptions 
of the writ’s historical background, a narrow description and a function-
alist description. According to the narrow description, the common law 
writ was used primarily to prevent arbitrary imprisonment by the king. 
As Blackstone explained, it is an “absolute necessity” that the king 
show cause “upon every commitment” and “that the court, upon a ha-
beas corpus, may examine into its validity, and, according to the cir-
cumstances of the case, may discharge, admit to bail, or remand the 
prisoner.”42 Thus, the framers envisioned a writ used as means for get-
ting prisoners and defendants into court, not a writ that ensures post-
conviction review.43  
 
37. See Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. Sch. J. 
Hum. Rts. 375, 375–77 (1998) (discussing the “divergent views of the history 
of habeas corpus”). 
38. Id. at 389–90. 
39. See Halliday, supra note 2, at 17, 40–41 (noting historians’ consideration of 
the writs de homine repligiando, de odio et atia, and mainprise as possible 
antecedents to habeas corpus ad subjiciendum). 
40. See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English 
Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 
584, 631–32 (2008) (discussing early habeas legislation in the United States). 
41. Clarke, supra note 37, at 375–377. 
42. 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *133–34.  
43. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 555–56 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
two ideas central to Blackstone’s understanding—due process as the right 
secured, and habeas corpus as the instrument by which due process could 
be insisted upon by a citizen illegally imprisoned—found expression in the 
Constitution’s Due Process and Suspension Clauses.”); Clarke, supra note 
37, at 378 (explaining that habeas corpus originated to “bring people—such 
as jurors or witnesses—before the court so that the judiciary could conduct 
its business”); Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts—Consti-
tutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 Cal. L. Rev. 335, 338–45 (1952) 
(detailing the history of habeas corpus at common law and at America’s 
founding and expressing doubt that the framers intended the writ to include 
federal review, since they decided not to put an affirmative right to the writ 
in the Bill of Rights). 
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In Darnel’s Case,44 this view’s paradigm case, King Charles I im-
prisoned more than seventy knights and gentlemen who had refused to 
contribute to the king’s “forced loan” strategy to fund war with Spain 
and France.45 Some of those prisoners sought habeas corpus and argued 
that because the king did not lawfully charge them with any crime, the 
jailer must release them.46 After the King’s Bench denied the writ, 
Darnel’s Case became a symbol of exactly the sort of executive oppress-
ion the framers wanted to prevent.47 For this narrow view, the Suspen-
sion Clause does not secure any “content” or substance to the writ; it 
simply ensures that prisoners receive due process of law.48 
According to the functionalist description, however, the common 
law writ of habeas corpus included more than just an assurance of due 
process in the face of tyranny; it embodied three underlying principles, 
each of which must play a role in the writ’s constitutional scope. First, 
the writ acted as a protector of individual liberty.49 Blackstone describe-
ed the writ as “the Bulwark of the English Constitution” and as “the 
Great Writ of liberty.”50 Two centuries later, Justice Brennan similarly 
described the writ’s history as “inextricably intertwined with the grow-
th of fundamental rights and of personal liberty.” Even those advoca-
ting for the narrow view cannot not help but explain the writ’s func-
tions in these broader terms. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,51 Justice Scalia 
wrote that the “Great Writ” lies at “the very core of liberty.”52  
The earliest statutes that recognized the writ, too, spoke in these 
terms. The Magna Carta broadly provided that “[n]o free man shall be 
taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished, or in any 
way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon him, except by 
 
44. (1627) 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. 1 (K.B.) (Eng.).  
45. Clarke, supra note 37, at 381. 
46. Id. at 382 (statements made by Serj. John Bramston, a counsel for the accused) 
(“[I]f this return shall be good, then his imprisonment shall not continue on 
for a time, but for ever; and the subjects of this kingdom may be restrained 
of their liberties perpetually . . . .”). 
47. Collings, Jr., supra note 43, at 336–388 (explaining that the American colonists 
familiarized themselves with the writ by reading and circulating pamphlets 
from the arguments in Darnel’s Case). 
48. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
49. Halliday, supra note 2, at 2 (“[T]he writ’s history has traditionally been 
approached as something grander, told as the tale of liberty: ‘the Great Writ 
of Liberty,’ as we have called it for three hundred years.”). 
50. 3 Blackstone, supra note 42, at *129.  
51. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
52. Id. at 554–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also William H. Rehnquist, All 
the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime 23 (1998) (describing 
the writ as “an important safeguard for personal liberty”). 
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the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”53 The Petition 
of Right later provided that “no freeman . . . [may] be imprisoned or 
detained . . .  contrary to the laws and franchise of the land.”54 And the 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679—originally entitled “An Act for the better 
Securing the Liberty of the Subject, and for Prevention of Imprison-
ments beyond the Seas”—protected “any person . . . committed or 
detained . . . for any crime.”55 As a close relative of due process rights, 
the writ served as a vehicle through which individuals may realize 
“great and fundamental laws”56 and as “instrument by which due pro-
cess rights could be insisted upon.”57 
Second, the writ gave judges the flexibility to correct errors because 
it was based on equitable principles.58 Common law judges “took ac-
count of petitioners’ individual circumstances, ‘rather than imposing 
obedience to a set of rules inscribed in precedents.’”59 In doing so, they 
protected individuals against “momentary diversions of law through 
practices that the English legal tradition and moral norms would  
never permit” and corrected “errors in judicial proceedings.”60 In James 
Bagg’s Case,61 a paradigm case for the functionalist view, the mayor 
removed Bagg from his public office for speaking ill of his fellow off-
icials.62 The mayor did not give Bagg notice of the charges against him, 
nor did he give Bagg an opportunity to answer the charges.63 Sir 
Edward Coke explained that the court had jurisdiction to issue the writ 
to correct “any manner of misgovernment” and that “no wrong or 
 
53. Magna Carta, ch. 39 (1215), reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties 17 
(R. Perry & J. Cooper eds., 1959) (emphasis added). 
54. Halliday & White, supra note 40, at 620. 
55. Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.). 
56. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487); see 
also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008) (“[T]he Framers considered 
the writ a vital instrument for the protection of individual liberty . . . .”). 
57. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 555 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
58. Erica Hashimoto, Reclaiming the Equitable Heritage of Habeas, 108 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 139, 139 (2014) (“Equity runs through the law of habeas corpus.”); 
see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 813 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (describing 
the writ as a “flexible” device). 
59. Hashimoto, supra note 58, at 143–44 (quoting Paul D. Halliday, Habeas 
Corpus: From England to Empire 102 (2010)). 
60. Halliday & White, supra note 40, at 609, 623 (describing the prerogative writs’ 
equitable remedies and the writ of habeas corpus’s “hidden righteousness”). 
61. (1615) 77 Eng. Rep. 1271. 
62. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 Ind. L. Rev. 343, 
352 (2012). 
63. Id. at 352–53. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 4·2016 
The Wall that AEDPA Built 
1158 
injury . . . can be done but that it shall be (here) reformed or punished 
by due course of law.”64 
Third, the writ checks governmental powers65 and provides an “ess-
ential mechanism in the separation-of-powers scheme.”66 Because the 
stakes are so high in criminal cases, the writ of habeas corpus calls upon 
the judiciary to ensure that neither individual liberties nor the integrity 
of the criminal proceedings have been compromised. As Alexander 
Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers, the writ of habeas corpus 
protects individuals against “the favorite and most formidable instru-
ments of tyranny” and against the “dangerous engine[s] of arbitrary 
government.”67 And as James Madison wrote, the writ provides a 
“double security” for “the rights of the people.”68 In Ex parte Merry-
man,69 Justice Taney observed that the early habeas corpus acts in 
England were not enacted merely to “bestow an immunity from arbi-
trary imprisonment” but instead to “cut off the abuses by which the 
government’s lust of power . . . had impaired so fundamental a privi-
lege.”70 
The functionalist approach provides a solid foundation from which 
a litigator can build a Suspension Clause challenge. Under this app-
roach, the writ is not just a device to ensure that the executive comports 
with due process of law when making arrests and detaining prisoners. 
Rather, it ensures that individual rights are not violated during the 
criminal process. As a means of securing those rights, it provides judges 
with the flexibility to issue a remedy and the power to check other 
branches of government.71 Part III explains that the constitutional con-
tours of the Suspension Clause remain largely unexplored. Yet, the 
 
64. Halliday & White, supra note 40, at 608–609 (quoting James Bagg’s Case 
(1615) 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1277–78). Although James Bagg’s Case dealt with 
the writ of mandamus, Halliday and White suggest that the writ of mandamus 
and the writ of habeas corpus, both prerogative writs, share these equitable 
principles. Id. 
65. Penny J. White, Federal Habeas Corpus, in Presiding over a Capital 
Case: A Benchbook for Judges 297 (Daphne A. Burns, Robin E. Wosji 
& William J. Brunson eds., 2010). 
66. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008). 
67. The Federalist No. 84, at 479–80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1999). 
68. Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus: Rethinking the Great Writ of 
Liberty 6 (2001). 
69. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
70. Id. at 151 (quoting Henry Hallam, 3 Constitutional History of England 
19 (1827)). 
71. The Court embraced this functionalist approach in Boumediene v. Bush. See 
infra, Part III.C. 
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Court has left some room to craft a Suspension Clause challenge to 
AEDPA’s Section 2254(d)(1); Part III explains how to best utilize that 
room. 
III. The Writ’s Constitutional Scope 
The Suspension Clause provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebell-
ion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”72 Because habeas cor-
pus embraced so many functions at common law, the Suspension Clause 
uniquely channels many interrelated legal principles in the United Sta-
tes: protection of individual liberty, the ability to check the branches 
of government that have the power to punish individuals, and the judi-
ciary’s power to review.73 
Beyond descriptions of the writ’s history, the Supreme Court con-
sistently avoids defining the constitutional parameters of the writ of 
habeas corpus. So the meaning of the Suspension Clause is “obscure,” 
“elusive,”74 and “shrouded in mystery.”75 The Court stated in I.N.S. v. 
St. Cyr76 that “[a]t the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause pro-
tects the writ ‘as it existed in 1789,’”77 and it assumed in Felker v. 
Turpin78 (albeit, for the sake of argument) that an inmate’s constitu-
tional privilege is more expansive today than it was at the founding.79 
This suggests that the Court is willing to look to the writ’s broader 
principles as well as the functions it has served to determine the writ’s 
constitutional scope.80 Yet the Suspension Clause does not act as a “one-
way ratchet” that includes all benefits that Congress chose to confer to 
 
72. U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
73. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (“[T]he writ of habeas 
corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation 
of powers.”). 
74. David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 
82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 59, 59 (2006). 
75. Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 Yale L.J. 600, 
602 (2009). 
76. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
77. Id. at 301 (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)) (emphasis added). 
78. 518 U.S. 651 (1996). 
79. Id. at 663–64 (“The writ of habeas corpus known to the Framers was quite 
different from that which exists today.”). 
80. Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 
47, 52 (2012) (“[In Boumediene] [t]he Court put to rest the notion that the 
Suspension Clause is an empty vessel and regulates only the conditions for 
congressional suspension of the writ.”). 
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individuals and courts in the past.81 A Suspension Clause challenge to 
Section 2254(d)(1), then, must fall safely in between these two extre-
mes. A challenger must argue (a) that the Suspension Clause preserves 
a right to the writ, upon which Congress may not infringe, (b) that the 
right to the writ includes meaningful review of federal claims, and (c) 
that the right to the writ includes at least some federal review. 
A. The Suspension Clause Preserves a Right to the Writ 
The Suspension Clause does not affirmatively state the privilege to 
the writ,82 and the writ is not expressly included in the Bill of Rights 
or any other constitutional amendment.  Yet, the Clause’s reference to 
the writ makes it “one of the few safeguards of liberty specified in [the] 
Constitution,”83 the only common-law writ mentioned in the Consti-
tution, and the Constitution’s “most explicit reference to remedies.”84 
Thus, the Court satisfies itself that the Framers’ mention of the writ 
affirms its continued existence85 and that this “great constitutional 
privilege” plays a critical role in United States democracy.86 
Moreover, habeas corpus is not, by itself, a “positive right.”87 It is 
a privilege and a writ. For some, these labels diminish the writ’s status. 
But the Supreme Court explained in Boumediene v. Bush88 that the 
privilege to the writ can act as both an individual right and a judicial 
right.89 At common law, the word “privilege” described the relationship 
between law and sovereignty in early modern England.90 Because all 
authority and power belonged to the king, the writ of habeas corpus, 
along with the other “prerogative writ[s],” did not belong to the king’s 
 
81. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 341 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
82. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201 (1830). 
83. Id. at 739. 
84. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1509 
n.329 (1987). 
85. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System 1162 (6th ed. 2009) (“The constitutional 
text appears to presuppose the existence of habeas corpus jurisdiction, but 
it does not affirmatively guarantee a right to habeas corpus.”). 
86. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807). 
87. Garrett, supra note 80, at 58 (explaining that by attempting to understand 
the writ as a right, “scholars seem to be imposing a modern question . . . on 
a premodern text with a common law answer—habeas is not a right, but 
judges may entertain a prayer for the writ and require the jailer to justify 
the legality of the detention”). 
88. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
89. Id. at 743; see infra Part III.C.  
90. Halliday & White, supra note 40, at 595–97. 
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“dependent subjects” but to the king himself;91 the writ “flowed from 
the king’s power and his mercy.”92 But the Framers rejected the notion 
that all legal power derived from the king and embraced the idea that 
each person was his own subject.93 Thus, they gave the power to issue 
the writ directly to the judiciary and gave individuals the power to seek 
the writ on their own behalf.94 Moreover, the Framers likely used the 
word “privilege” simply “to avoid mentioning some rights to the exclu-
sion of others.”95 
Most importantly, Article III of the Constitution gives Congress the 
power to create and, theoretically, destroy all inferior courts.96 So 
AEDPA’s proponents argue that Congress does not have to give any 
federal courts jurisdiction over habeas postconviction proceedings. In 
Ex parte Bollman,97 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that “the power 
to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be 
given by written law.”98 Though some have argued that the Consti-
tution contains internal limitations on Congress’s broad power to regu-
late federal-court jurisdiction,99 the Court has long held that these limit-
ations do not exist.100 
The Court, however, recognizes that external rights may limit Con-
gress’s power to strip federal courts of jurisdiction. In particular, the 
Court treats the privilege to the writ of habeas corpus as a constitu- 
 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 672–73. The King’s Bench implemented the privilege to the writ “to 
ensure that royal franchises were not abused—thereby protecting the liberties 
of [the king’s] subjects.” Id. at 630. 
93. Id. at 671. 
94. Id. at 681–83. 
95. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008). 
96. See Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control 
the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New 
Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 52–56 (1975) (“[T[he greater power of total 
abolition logically includes the lesser power of removing certain areas from 
their jurisdiction.”). 
97. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). 
98. Id. at 94. 
99. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816) (“[C]ongress 
are bound to create some inferior courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction 
which, under the constitution, is exclusively vested in the United States, and 
of which the supreme court cannot take original cognizance.”). 
100. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“[H]aving a right to 
prescribe, Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction 
of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have 
no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”). 
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tional right that can push back against Congressional power.101 In 
Boumediene v. Bush,102 the Court struck down the jurisdiction-stripping 
portion of the Military Commissions Act as an unconstitutional suspen-
sion of the writ.103 The MCA provided that no judge had the power to 
“hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus” by any 
alien detainee who had been designated an enemy combatant.104 The 
Court explained that the Suspension Clause “guarantees an affirmative 
right to judicial inquiry into the causes of detention” and “protects the 
rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judi-
ciary to call the jailer to account.”105 Because Congress “intended to 
circumscribe habeas review” and did not provide an adequate substitute 
for federal habeas review, Congress violated the petitioner’s entitlement 
to a “meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pur-
suant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.”106 
Therefore, the Suspension Clause impliedly guarantees a substan-
tive constitutional right, or entitlement, that Congress cannot take 
away. Still, the scope of this right remains largely unexplored.  
B. The Right to the Writ Includes the Right to Meaningful Review 
A prisoner’s opportunity to have his claims heard through a full 
and fair process is an important part of habeas corpus.107 At the very 
least, habeas corpus should serve as a “backstop” because “it is . . . the 
responsibility of the states under the due process clause to furnish a 
criminal defendant with a full and fair opportunity to make his defense 
and litigate his case.”108 The Court has explained that the constitutional 
scope of the writ “entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to 
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous applic-
ation or interpretation’ of relevant law.”109  
Without meaningful review, the writ’s goals of preserving individual 
rights and checking governmental power cannot be realized. Meaningful 
 
101. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 
U. Miami L. Rev. 275, 275–76, 302 (2008) (explaining that it is unclear 
whether the writ is a “structural” right or an “individual” right). 
102. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
103. Id. at 724–30. 
104. Id. at 736 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)). 
105. Id. at 744–45. 
106. Id. at 776–777, 779 (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)). 
107.  Marceau, supra note 7, at 137–46. 
108.  Bator, supra note 21, at 456 (“[A]t the minimum, some kind of supervisory 
jurisdiction should exist to test the question whether the processes furnished 
by the previous tribunal were meaningful and rational.”). 
109. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)). 
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review must include “the means to correct errors,” “some authority to 
assess the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence,” and “the authority 
to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that was not 
introduced during the earlier proceeding.”110 An inmate’s ability to 
merely file a petition does not meet this standard.111 And the federal 
court must be able to do more than simply “rubber stamp” the state 
court’s decision.112 
This standard does not require federal courts to throw out tradit-
ional procedural requirements, such as exhaustion of state remedies. It 
does not ask federal courts to overlook Stone v. Powell’s113 restriction 
on Fourth Amendment claims. It does not require federal courts to 
employ something more lenient than Brecht v. Abrahamson’s114 harm-
less error review. And it does not demand that federal courts hear 
claims arising under wholly new constitutional rules, as prohibited by 
Teague v. Lane.115 However, the constitutional scope of the writ does 
entitle inmates to some “independent review” of constitutional claims.116 
It is only through meaningful review that the writ can effectuate the 
principles it embodies. 
C. The Right to the Writ Includes Some Federal Review  
of Federal Claims 
The most difficult part of crafting a Suspension Clause attack on 
the AEDPA wall is showing that the constitutional scope of the writ 
includes federal review for state prisoners. Many scholars agree that 
Congress cannot constitutionally bar federal courts from reviewing all 
state court convictions but have difficulty articulating why.117 But ha-
beas petitioners convicted in state courts could not obtain federal 
review until Congress gave them that right in 1867, so it is difficult to 
argue that the framers envisioned federal habeas review.118 Though the 
 
110. Id. at 786. 
111. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 461 (1953). 
112. Woolley, supra note 29, at 435. 
113. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
114. 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
115. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
116. Woolley, supra note 29, at 435. 
117. See 1 James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus 
Practice and Procedure § 2.3, at 15–17 (2d ed. 1994) (describing the wide 
array of purposes that courts have attributed to habeas corpus). 
118. Habeas Corpus Act, 14 Stat. 385 (1867) (expanding scope of writ to all cases 
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the 
Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States). 
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Court held in Boumediene v. Bush119 that the Suspension Clause pushes 
back against Congress’s power to limit federal court jurisdiction, the 
petitioner in that case was a Guantanamo Bay detainee who could only 
obtain postconviction review through the “limited procedure” of the 
Detainee Treatment Act; unlike the habeas petitioners under AEDPA’s 
Section 2254(d), the Boumediene petitioner did not receive collateral 
postconviction review in state courts.120 Nevertheless, two fairly recent 
cases, along with the Boumediene Court’s functionalist approach, could 
help a defense attorney mount a strong Suspension Clause challenge. 
The Court has twice suggested that Congress runs into Suspension 
Clause problems where it prohibits federal courts from reviewing habeas 
petitions at all. In Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,121 an inmate’s Ford 
claim was properly dismissed as premature by the federal district 
court.122 When the inmate refiled at the appropriate time, the AEDPA’s 
Section 2244(b) prevented the district court from hearing the claim 
because it was a “second or successive” petition.123 As the dissent point-
ed out, the inmate’s claim fell within “the unmistakable language” of 
AEDPA’s bar.124 Yet, the Court refused to read the statute this way 
because it “would bar the prisoner from ever obtaining federal habeas 
review,” which would have “far reaching and seemingly perverse” impli-
cations on the statute’s constitutionality.125  
Similarly, the Court held in Panetti v. Quarterman126 that inmates 
may raise Ford claims later in the habeas proceedings if their mental 
conditions did not arise until after they filed their first petitions.127 
Thus, the Court created the second-in-time, first-petition exception to 
ensure that the AEDPA’s Section 2244(b) did not infringe upon the 
constitutional scope of the writ. 
Moreover, the Boumediene Court’s functionalist approach leaves 
some room to argue that the Suspension Clause entitles state prisoners 
to some collateral postconviction review of their federal claims in fed-
eral courts. The Court explained that the writ is “a vital instrument  
to secure [individual liberty]” and an “essential mechanism in the 
 
119. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
120. Id. at 773–79. 
121. 523 U.S. 637 (1998).  
122. Id. at 640. 
123. Id. at 640–41. 
124. Id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
125. Id. at 644–45. 
126.  551 U.S. 930 (2007).  
127. Id. at 945. 
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separation-of-powers scheme.”128 That is, the writ’s ultimate goal is to 
protect individuals against “cyclical abuses,” such as unlawfulness in 
criminal proceedings.129 The writ’s means of achieving that goal are to 
“preserve[] limited government,” to “maintain the ‘delicate balance of 
governance,’” and to “make Government accountable.”130 
States can, and often do, abuse the criminal process and ignore 
individual rights,131 not unlike the executive at common law.  State 
criminal justice systems often let constitutional violations such as pro-
secutorial misconduct—tampering with witnesses, withholding excul-
patory evidence, and even destroying evidence—go unnoticed.132 Fur-
ther, a good deal of academic evidence shows that some states even 
“systematically violate criminal defendants’ rights.”133 For example, 
many states use a “bait-and-switch” technique to “prevent[] defendants 
from ever having their federal claims considered.”134 The Court, too, has 
recognized the need to check the state criminal process through habeas 
corpus. In Brown v. Allen,135 the Court held that federal courts have 
the power to review constitutional claims de novo and to relitigate those 
claims even if they were fully litigated in state court.136 As Justice 
Frankfurter reasoned, state law-enforcement agencies sometimes abuse 
 
128. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739, 743 (2008). 
129. Id. at 745. 
130. Id. at 742, 744–45 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) 
(plurality opinion)). 
131. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 748, 756–59 (1987) (discussing Supreme Court habeas cases arising 
from state courts). 
132. Biale, supra note 2, at 1337, 1347. 
133. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 
1, 2, 17–22 (2010) (describing many ways in which “state courts still routinely 
violate defendants’ constitutional rights,” such as “routinely underfund[ing] 
public defender offices,” employing “procedural rules that systematically 
prevent defendants from asserting right-to-counsel claims,” defaulting 
defendants’ federal claims after misapplying “the state’s contemporaneous 
objection rule,” and withholding exculpatory or impeachment evidence). 
134. Id. at 20 (“A criminal defendant attempts to raise a claim on direct appeal 
and is told by the appellate courts that the claim can or should be raised 
during state postconviction review. However, when the defendant attempts 
to raise the claim on state postconviction review, the postconviction court 
holds that the claim is procedurally defaulted for failure to comply with a 
state procedural rule requiring him to raise it on direct appeal.”). 
135. 344 U.S. 443 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Townsend v. Sain, 372 
U.S. 293 (1963). 
136. Id. at 459–60.  
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their power, and “even the highest State courts have failed to recognize” 
these constitutional violations.137 
For the past century and a half, the writ has functioned to check 
such abuses in the state criminal process.138 Congress first addressed 
this evil through the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, which enabled federal 
post-conviction review of state prisoners.139 Since the Reconstruction 
Era, habeas corpus has provided individuals convicted in state courts 
some form of federal collateral review to ensure that those individuals 
are not held in violation of federal law.140 In Fay v. Noia,141 the Court 
acknowledged that habeas corpus must be “viewed against the back-
drop of post–Civil War efforts in Congress to deal severely with the 
States of the former Confederacy” and that part of habeas’ role was  
to prevent unconstitutional incarceration by state governments.142 
Likewise, the Court in Reed v. Ross143 stated that after the Civil War, 
“Congress sought to ‘interpose the federal courts between the States 
and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights—to protect 
the people from unconstitutional action.’”144 
Additionally, federal courts are poised to check the state criminal 
process on questions of federal law. The Court recognizes that state 
courts have at least two motives to turn a blind eye to inmates’ consti-
tutional claims. First, “[t]he greater the difficulties of detecting and 
punishing crime, the greater the temptation to place a strained con-
struction on statutes to supply what may be thought to be more eff-
icient means of enforcing law.”145 Second, judges often lose elections 
 
137. Id. at 511 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Despite this, Justice Frankfurter’s 
reasoning was also based on the authority given to federal courts by the 
previous habeas statute. Id. at 499 (“Congress could have left the enforcement 
of federal constitutional rights governing the administration of criminal justice 
in the States exclusively to the State courts.”). 
138. Andrea Keilen & Maurie Levin, Moving Forward: A Map for Meaningful 
Habeas Reform in Texas Capital Cases, 34 Am. J. Crim. L. 207, 214–15 (2007). 
139. Chemerinsky, supra note, 131 at 753. 
140. Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, 
and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 535, 546 (1999). 
141. 372 U.S. 391, 422–23 (1963) (holding that an inmate’s procedural default in 
a state-court proceeding did not bar federal jurisdiction because “the very 
nature of the writ” gives federal courts broad power to independently 
adjudicate habeas corpus cases), overruled on other grounds by Wainwright 
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
142. Id. at 415. 
143. 468 U.S. 1 (1984). 
144. Id. at 10 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)). 
145. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 511 (1953) (quoting Attorney General William 
D. Mitchell). 
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based on decisions to reverse death sentences or order new trials, while 
federal judges are independent and hold life tenure.146 Though the Court 
has also said that state judges are no less competent than federal 
judges,147 “the very existence of federal courts and most federal jurisdic-
tion is based on a distrust of state courts.”148 
Federal habeas review of state court proceedings does not intrude 
upon the state’s power over its own criminal laws. Contrarily, federal 
habeas review is an example of “the federal system . . . working as it 
should.”149 States have the power to administer and enforce their own 
criminal laws, but they do not have the power to violate federal rights 
in doing so.150 Moreover, the federal system exists to ensure the pro-
tection of individuals, not to protect states no matter the cost.151 
IV. AEDPA’s Suspension Wall 
The AEDPA’s Section 2254(d)(1) provides that federal courts shall 
not grant the writ of habeas corpus   
146. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 382 (1977) (“We are fully cognizant of the 
critical importance of life tenure, particularly when judges are required to 
vindicate the constitutional rights of persons who have been found guilty 
of criminal offenses.”); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist 
Analysis of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1515, 1517 (2007) 
(“Only Article III judges, who unlike their state counterparts are always polit-
ically independent and experts in federal law, can be trusted ultimately to 
expound that law accurately and guarantee its supremacy and uniformity.”); 
Woolley, supra note 29, at 433 (“In key judicial elections, [state] judges have 
not been reelected because of their decisions to overturn death sentences.”) 
147. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976) (asserting that the Court 
is “unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate 
sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the 
several States”). 
148. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal 
Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233, 283 (1988); see also Burt Neuborne, The 
Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1105 (1977) (referring to the Court’s 
assumption of parity between state and federal courts as “at best, a dangerous 
myth”); Mitchum, 407 at 242 (explaining that in the § 1983 context “[Congress] 
realized that state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication 
of [constitutional] rights”). 
149. Eric M. Freedman, State Post-Conviction Remedies in the Next Fifteen Years: 
How Synergy Between the State and Federal Governments Can Improve the 
Criminal Justice System Nationally, 24 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 298, 299 (2012). 
150. See U.S. Const. art I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.”). 
151. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (“That the people have an 
original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, 
in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on 
which the whole American fabric has been erected.”). 
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with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in 
State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim 
. . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.152  
Though this provision does not use the word “deference,”153 it is 
“colloquially referred to as the deference provision.”154 The language in 
this provision, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, carries three bar-
riers to substantive review: (1) it applies to any claim that was “adjudi-
cated on the merits” in state courts; (2) the petitioner cannot obtain 
relief unless the state court decision was an “unreasonable application” 
of federal law; (3) the violation of federal law must be “clearly estab-
lished . . . as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”155 
Collectively, these three barriers, along with the Court’s interpretation 
of them, create AEDPA’s enigmatic wall: the AEDPA drastically ex-
pands the level of deference owed to the state criminal process while 
simultaneously stripping away any assurances that the state process is 
full, fair, or meaningful.156 
A. Adjudication on the Merits: Deferring to the State’s Process 
When a federal court receives a habeas petition, it must first decide 
whether the claims in that petition were “adjudicated on the merits” in 
the state court proceedings.157 A claim is not adjudicated on the merits 
 
152. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1219 (1996). In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), 
the Supreme Court interpreted the phrases “contrary to” and “unreasonable 
application of” as holding two separate meanings. Id. at 404–05. While this 
interpretation poses some of its own problems, see id. at 384–90 (Stevens, 
J., concurring), the majority of the Section 2254(d)(1) cases fall under the 
“unreasonable application” piece. Id. at 406. The scope of this Comment is 
limited to cases challenging that state courts unreasonably applied federal law. 
153. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 104. 
154. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 
259, 260 (2006). 
155. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 104. 
156. See Larry W. Yackle, Federal Evidentiary Hearings Under the New Habeas 
Corpus Statute, 6 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 135, 140 (1996) (“Bluntly stated, it 
appears that the federal habeas courts must accept state court findings at 
face value—no questions asked.”). 
157. Brittany Glidden, When the State Is Silent: An Analysis of AEDPA’s 
Adjudication Requirement, 27 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 177, 181–82 
(2001); Claudia Wilner, “We Would Not Defer to That Which Did Not Exist”: 
AEDPA Meets the Silent State Court Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1442, 1457 
(2002). 
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where the state court disposes of the claim on procedural grounds.158 If 
claims were not adjudicated on the merits, then federal courts “are 
obliged to apply de novo review.”159 But if they were, federal courts 
must apply AEDPA deference—a near-impossible-to-meet standard of 
review—to the state court’s decision.160 This phrase unnecessarily places 
two difficult hurdles in front of habeas petitioners. First, the Court in 
Harrington v. Richter161 held that when state courts issue summary 
denials, “the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits.”162 Second, 
the Court’s decision in Cullen v. Pinholster163 means that petitioners 
cannot introduce new evidence of their federal claims in federal courts 
if those claims had already been adjudicated on the merits in state 
court.164 Each of these barriers add their own layers of deference that 
federal courts must apply before asking whether the state court un-
reasonably applied federal law. Accordingly, each contributes to 
AEDPA’s enigmatic suspension wall. 
1. Summary Denials and the Presumption of Adjudication on the Merits 
Summary denials, also known as “postcard denials,”165 are decisions 
that are “unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief 
has been denied”166 or that “dispose of whole claims in a perfunctory 
manner.”167 These denials are fairly common in state courts, and they 
are not a new feature of habeas litigation.168 But before AEDPA, sum-
mary denials did not affect federal review because habeas petitions were 
 
158. 2 Hertz & Liebman, supra note 117, at 1421–22. 
159. Id. 
160. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 104. 
161. 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011). 
162. Id. at 784. 
163. 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).  
164. Id. at 1400–01. The AEDPA provides a few very narrow exceptions. Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 104. 
165. Monique Anne Gaylor, Postcards from the Bench: Federal Habeas Review of 
Unarticulated State Court Decisions, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 1263, 1264 (2003) 
(citing Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
166. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 
167. Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the Federal Habeas Statute: Is It Beyond 
Reason?, 56 Hastings L.J. 283, 284 (2004). Frequently, state courts respond 
to habeas petitions simply by asserting that a “[p]etitioner’s other claims are 
without merit,” id., or that “[r]elief is denied on the merits.” Marceau, supra 
note 7, at 114. 
168. Glidden, supra note 157, at 179. 
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decided de novo.169 Summary denials do not indicate what law the state 
court applied; they do not indicate what facts the state court consider-
ed; they do not even indicate what claims the state court considered.170 
Indeed, the denials themselves offer no assurances that the state court 
even considered the petitioner’s federal question.171 It seems necessary 
to ask, then, “[s]hould federal courts be required to defer to that which 
may not exist?”172 
According to the Richter Court, the answer is “yes.” There, the 
Court held that federal courts must “presume[] that the state court 
adjudicated the claim on the merits,” even when a state court issues an 
unexplained summary denial of the petitioner’s claims.173 The Court 
rejected the argument that giving AEDPA deference to unexplained 
decisions “will encourage state courts to withhold explanations for their 
decisions” because “state courts are influenced by considerations other 
than avoiding scrutiny.”174 The Court added that “requiring” state 
courts to explain their decisions “could undercut state practices de-
signed to preserve the integrity of the case-law tradition,” and it could 
prevent state courts from “concentrat[ing] its resources . . . where opin-
ions are most needed.”175 
Scholars have noted that this presumption of adjudication, by itself, 
has serious Suspension Clause implications.176 The presumption essen-
tially tells federal courts to defer to state courts in order to decide 
whether or not to defer to the actual decision. But AEDPA’s current 
scheme offers no assurances that state courts will give a petitioner’s 
claim any meaningful review. 
 
169. Wilner, supra note 157, at 1455 (“Prior to AEDPA . . . federal habeas courts 
. . . did not have to review state court reasoning; federal habeas courts decided 
legal and mixed questions de novo.”).  
170. Glidden, supra note 157, at 182–83. 
171. Id. at 183. 
172. Wilner, supra note 157, at 1443; see Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 47 (1st 
Cir. 2001) (“[W]e can hardly defer to the state court on an issue that the state 
court did not address.”). 
173. Richter, 513 S. Ct. at 784–85 (emphasis added). 
174. Id. at 784. 
175. Id. 
176. See Marceau, supra note 7, at 137–46 (explaining that “if the state court 
review is not procedurally full and fair” and there is no federal oversight of 
that process, a habeas petitioner likely has strong Due Process and Suspension 
Clause challenges); Glidden, supra note 157, at 200 (“[V]iewing a perfunctory 
decision as an adjudication raises due process concerns when there is a 
possibility that a properly raised constitutional claim did not receive legal 
review.”). 
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On some occasions, it is fairly clear that a state court issued a sum-
mary denial without reviewing a claim at all. In McClellan v. Rapelje,177 
a Sixth Circuit case, the Michigan Court of Appeals summarily denied 
the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, incorrectly stat-
ing that the petitioner procedurally defaulted.178 Michigan argued that 
it had, in fact, reached the merits of the case, but later conceded that 
it “did not have the lower court record when it rendered its decision.”179 
Similarly in Bell v. Jarvis,180 the petitioner argued that he had been 
denied a fair trial because the trial judge closed the doors to the public. 
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court holds that “structural errors” 
like the “denial of a public trial” require reversal,181 the state trial court 
summarily denied the petitioner’s claim by saying only that he “failed 
to state a claim.”182 The state appellate court then summarily affirmed 
by saying only “Petition for Writ of Certiorari is denied.”183 Though the 
trial court did not make any factual findings or give any reasons for its 
decision, the Fourth Circuit deferred to the state court and denied the 
petitioner’s claim.184 In these types of cases, AEDPA’s failure to oversee 
the state court process denied petitioners their rights to meaningful 
review of their federal claims. 
In addition, the presumption impacts the level of AEDPA deference 
owed to state court decisions. Judge Friendly once explained that “[a] 
written statement of reasons, almost essential if there is to be judicial 
review, is desirable” on several grounds: the need for “justification is a 
powerful preventative of wrong decisions”; it “tends to effectuate intra-
agency uniformity”; and it allows for judicial review.185 Because federal 
courts reviewing summary denials do not have any legal reasoning to 
review, they are forced to imagine all possible reasons why the state 
court denied relief and, in some cases, simply “craft a story that makes 
 
177. 703 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2013). 
178. Id. at 348. 
179. Id. at 349. Luckily, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that because the trial court 
had also denied the petitioner’s claim on basis of a procedural default, “there 
[was] reason to think that the Michigan Court of Appeals did not reach the 
merits of Petitioner’s claim.” Id. at 348–49. 
180. 236 F.3d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 2000). Note that this case was decided prior to 
Richter. 
181. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1999) (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 
U.S. 39 (1984)). 
182. Bell, 703 F.3d at 176 (dissenting opinion). 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 168. 
185. Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1292 
(1975). 
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the state result justifiable.”186 Moreover, federal courts “must review 
the state court’s application of law to the facts.”187 But state courts 
often do not make factual findings when they issue summary denials, 
so federal courts must “recreat[e]” possible scenarios and consider any 
“plausible factual findings.”188 In other words, Richter tells courts creat-
ed under the power of Article III that they must guess. 
The Richter Court’s federalism concerns seem ill founded. The 
Court framed the question as whether AEDPA “requir[es]” state courts 
to give a statement of reasons.189 But the real question was whether 
AEDPA deference applies when a state does not give a statement of 
reasons. The latter formulation makes clear that state courts may 
“choose whether or not they wish to take on the burden and be deferred 
to.”190 “If the state court wishes to take advantage of the ‘unreasonable 
application’ clause of § 2254(d)(1), it can write; if not, then not.”191 
While some may argue that “this is tantamount to requiring state 
courts to write” because all judges want deference and no judge wants 
to be overturned, a state judge’s interest in keeping his reputation in-
tact surely does not trump the petitioner’s interest in meaningful review 
of his federal claim.192   
2. Pinholster: Deferring to the Evidence in Front of State Courts 
Before Cullen v. Pinholster,193 federal courts could consider “evid-
ence developed at the federal level—through exhibits attached to the 
petition, evidentiary hearings, discovery, or record supplementation—
to determine whether § 2254(d)(1) had been satisfied.”194 Under Sec-
tion 2254(e)(2), federal courts cannot hold evidentiary hearings if a pet-
itioner “failed to develop a factual basis of a claim in [s]tate court,”195 
though there are some exceptions. And for a petitioner challenging the 
state court’s findings of fact, Section 2254(d)(2) explicitly limits a feder-
al court’s review to “the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceed- 
 
186. Glidden, supra note 157, at 190. 
187. Id. at 191. 
188. Id. at 191–192. 
189. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011).  
190. Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., 
concurring). 
191. Lee, supra note 167, at 312. 
192. Id. (“I am unmoved by this argument.”). 
193. 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).  
194. Wiseman, supra note 12, at 962. 
195. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218–19 (1996). 
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ing.”196 However, if a petitioner did develop a factual basis for his  
claim in state court and if a petitioner is not making a Section 
2254(d)(2) challenge, then the federal court can allow for an evidentiary 
hearing within its “sound discretion.”197 
But Pinholster “changed the rules.”198 There, the petitioner alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate or present sev-
eral important pieces of mitigating evidence.199 After the state supreme 
court summarily denied the petition, the federal district court granted 
the petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing and, after hearing 
the evidence, granted habeas relief.200 But the Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that 
was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”201 
Thus, if a petitioner obtains new evidence on a claim that was adjudic-
ated on the merits in state court, federal courts can no longer hear that 
evidence, no matter how grave the injustice. 
Under many circumstances, Pinholster prevents petitioners from 
obtaining any review, let alone meaningful review, of their federal 
claims. The Fourteenth Amendment does not “require the [s]tate to 
appoint counsel for indigent prisoners seeking state postconviction re-
lief.”202 So “the great majority” of state prisoners do not have the aid 
of counsel to “discover and document relevant facts” in state post-
conviction proceedings.203 Additionally, “virtually every State provides 
for the summary disposition of post-conviction claims without a hear-
ing,” and even where petitioners can get a hearing, they must first 
“cross[] high procedural hurdle[s].”204 
B. Unreasonable Application of: Deferring to the State’s Application  
of Federal Law 
The AEDPA’s Section 2254(d) requires habeas petitioners to show 
that the state court’s decision was “an unreasonable application of” 
clearly established federal law.205 A state court unreasonably applies 
federal law if it identifies the correct legal rule “but unreasonably  
196. Id. 
197. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). 
198. Wiseman, supra note 12, at 963. 
199. Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 660–61 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
200. Id. at 661. 
201. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1391 (2011). 
202. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
203. Wiseman, supra note 12, at 973. 
204. Id. at 974–75. 
205. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218–19 (1996). 
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applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.”206 This is 
an “extremely deferential standard of review”207 that makes up the 
biggest portion of the AEDPA suspension wall and barricades petition-
ers off from receiving any substantive review of their claims.208 
The Court consistently states that a state court decision is not 
unreasonable just because it is incorrect.209 Further, “even a strong case 
for relief”210 and even “clear error” in the state court’s judgment fall 
short of the unreasonableness standard.211 In Williams v. Taylor,212 the 
Court added one limit to its seemingly unbounded reasonableness spec-
trum. It rejected the argument that the unreasonableness standard 
requires the petitioner to show that all “reasonable jurists” would find 
the state court’s decision unreasonable and, instead, held that fed- 
eral courts must ask whether the state court decision was “objectively 
unreasonable.”213 
But the Court has since, somewhat quietly, pushed passed this upp-
er boundary of the reasonableness “spectrum” to include a more subjec-
tive inquiry.214 In Harrington v. Richter,215 the Court explained that “[a] 
state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal 
habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the corr-
ectness of the state court’s decision.”216 There, the petitioner argued 
that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to consult 
blood experts to help absolve him of a murder he claimed he did not 
 
206. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). 
207. John-Charles v. California, 646 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2011). 
208. Ritter, supra note 24, at 57 (“[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ clause has 
proven to be most critical to the availability of habeas corpus relief.”). 
209. See Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011) (explaining that the AEDPA’s 
purpose is “to guard against only extreme malfunctions in the state criminal 
justice system”). 
210. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 
211. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (“The gloss of clear error fails to 
give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) 
with unreasonableness. It is not enough that a federal habeas court, in its 
‘independent review of the legal question’ is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that 
the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) (citation omitted). 
212. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
213. Id. at 365. 
214. See Biale, supra note 2, at 1359–60 (explaining that the Court acknowledged 
that it was not overruling Williams); Ritter, supra note 24, at 65–70 (noting 
the Court’s shifting emphasis towards a “reasonable jurist standard”). 
215. 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011). 
216. Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 
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commit.217 After the California Supreme Court issued a summary denial, 
the Ninth Circuit granted the writ and held that the court unreasonably 
denied the petitioner’s Strickland claim.218 The Supreme Court reversed 
the Ninth Circuit and elaborated on its “fairminded jurists” standard 
by explaining that federal courts must look to the arguments or theories 
that “could have supported” the state’s decision then “ask whether it 
is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or 
theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this 
Court.”219 It later emphasized that the writ may issue only where the 
state court’s decision “was so lacking in justification that there was an 
error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 
possibility for fairminded disagreement.”220 The Court admonished the 
Ninth Circuit for relying solely on its certainty that a Strickland viol-
ation occurred and “overlook[ing] arguments that would otherwise just-
ify the state court’s result.”221 
Scholars quickly pointed out that Richter’s “fairminded jurists”  
test is even more onerous than Williams’ “objectively unreasonable” 
test. They have dubbed the test “near-total deference,”222 “super-
deferential,”223 “one of the most uncharitable standards of review known 
to law,”224 “an unworkable . . . standard that fundamentally contradicts 
American common law decision-making,”225 and “dangerous and im-
proper.”226 Much like the subjective test rejected in Williams, the “fair-
minded jurists” test requires federal courts to look at “the reasonable-
ness of the decision makers, as opposed to the decision, as grounds to 
 
217. Id. at 783. In his petition to the California Supreme Court, the petitioner 
offered affidavits from three types of forensic experts that substantiated 
his defense. Id.  
218. Id. at 785–86. 
219. Id. at 786. 
220. Id. at 786–87. 
221. Id. at 786. 
222. Reinhardt, supra note 5, at 1224; see id. at 1229 (“[I]f the ‘fairminded jurist’ 
rule were taken literally, it would mean that a federal court could never grant 
habeas relief. That is because, in order to grant habeas relief, we would 
need to find that each of the state court judges who denied the petitioner’s 
claim was not fairminded . . . .”). 
223. Michael M. O’Hear, Bypassing Habeas: The Right to Effective Assistance 
Requires Earlier Supreme Court Intervention in Cases of Attorney Incompe-
tence, 25 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 110, 115 (2012). 
224. Marceau, supra note 7, at 97. 
225. Ruth A. Moyer, Disagreement About Disagreement: The Effect of a Circuit 
Split or “Other Circuit” Authority on the Availability of Federal Habeas 
Relief for State Convicts, 82 U. Cin. L. Rev. 831, 857 (2014). 
226. Ritter, supra note 24, at 86. 
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deny habeas relief.”227 This test leaves little room, if any, for judges to 
assess the merits to a petitioner’s claim.228 Instead, federal courts ask 
whether any judges did, in fact, disagree and whether any fairminded 
judges—“even if only one”—could have possibly disagreed.229 To answer 
this, federal courts often count noses or imagine whether any legal 
theory could have reasonably supported the state court’s result.230 The 
answer to this question must be “yes” in almost all cases because habeas 
cases do not reach federal court unless state court judges have already 
denied relief.231 
Richter interprets AEDPA as forcing federal courts to give more 
deference to state courts in habeas proceedings than to any other 
 
227. Biale, supra note 2, at 1363. Some federal courts insist that the unreasonable-
ness standard is objective. See, e.g., Dow v. Virga, 729 F.3d 1041, 1051 n.8 
(9th Cir. 2013) (“The ‘fairminded jurist’ standard is an objective standard 
of law . . . . Fairminded jurists can make mistakes in legal reasoning or 
judgment, and if such a mistake is beyond reasonable legal disagreement, the 
‘fairminded jurist’ standard is satisfied. Were we to apply a fairminded jurist 
standard literally, a federal court could never reverse a state court’s habeas 
decision.”). 
228. In Williams v. Taylor, Justice Stevens argued that Section 2254(d) allows 
federal judges to exercise some independent review, but the majority rejected 
that argument. 529 U.S. 362, 403–04 (2000). 
229. See Ritter, supra note 24, at 71 (“[The federal court] must nevertheless deny 
the writ if it believes that a fair-minded jurist somewhere could debate that 
conclusion.”); see also Frost v. Pryor, 749 F.3d 1212, 1225 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(“If, however, some fairminded jurists could possibly agree with the state 
court decision, then it was not unreasonable and the writ should be denied.”); 
Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1220 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f some fairminded 
jurists could agree with the state court’s decision, although others might 
disagree, federal habeas relief must be denied.”). 
230. See Biale, supra note 2, at 1362–65 (explaining different courts’ subjective 
views). For cases in which federal judges count noses to see whether any 
other judges disagreed, see Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 473–74 (6th Cir. 
2012) (denying petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim because “[i]t is not 
unreasonable to believe, as did at least three justices on the Kentucky Supreme 
Court, as well as the trial-court judge, that confrontation only requires that 
a declarant be made available in the courtroom for a criminal defendant to 
call during his own case”); Garrus v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 694 F.3d 394, 
416 (3d Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“The existence of 
a circuit split demonstrates that it is wrong to conclude that “‘fairminded 
jurists could [not] disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision” 
in this case.”) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)). 
231. Biale, supra note 2, at 1364 (explaining that “[n]o one wants to accuse a fellow 
jurist of lacking a personal characteristic necessary for judging,” i.e., being 
fairminded.); Nathaniel Koslof, Comment, Insurmountable Hill: How Undue 
AEDPA Deference Has Undermined The Atkins Ban on Executing The 
Intellectually Disabled, 54 B.C. L. Rev. E. Supp. 189, 195–96 (2013) (“[I]t 
will almost invariably be the case that at least some fair-minded jurists will 
agree . . . .”). 
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governmental body in any other context. The “concept of deference,” 
even in areas of law where federal courts punt the most, “does not 
require a federal court to back away in all cases save for ones in which 
the state’s decision was ‘off the charts’ in its incorrectness.”232 For 
example, when courts apply Chevron deference and rationality review, 
they do not look primarily to the decisions of other governmental bodies 
without conducting their own independent assessments.233 Further, 
there is a “quid pro quo” between courts and the governmental body 
receiving.234 Agencies must earn Chevron deference by first providing a 
full and reasoned explanation for their decisions in accordance with the 
APA.235 Similarly, courts do not apply rational basis review where they 
know that the government has hampered an individual’s constitutional 
rights.236 Contrarily, AEDPA deference is completely unearned; state 
courts can and often do issue summary denials of habeas without any 
reasoned explanation.237 And AEDPA deference applies even where fed-
eral courts know that a state infringed upon a petitioner’s constitutional  
232. Ritter, supra note 24, at 77. 
233. Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., if Congress 
has not “spoken to the precise question at issue,” courts examine the statute’s 
history and purpose to determine “whether the agency’s answer is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.” 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
While a court cannot simply “impose its own construction on the statute,” 
it is at least able to conduct some independent assessment of whether the 
agency’s construction is consistent with the statute. Id. at 843. But see 
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1938) (explaining 
that “the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be 
presumed” but that courts can look at whether those presumption “have 
ceased to exist” in an as applied challenge). 
234. See Marceau, supra note 31, at 33 (“[T]he notion that unfair state procedures 
obviate the need for federal deference—this notion that deference and 
procedural adequacy have a quid pro quo relationship—has an established 
history in the context of procedural default litigation.”). 
235. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
30 (1983) (holding that parts of the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration’s regulations were arbitrary and capricious because the agency did 
not adequately explain its decisions). 
236. Rationality review might be more analogous to AEDPA deference. See 
F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993) (explaining that 
rationality review begins with a “strong presumption of validity,” and “never 
require[s] a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute,” and 
places the burden of proof on the challenger). But courts apply heightened 
scrutiny, not rational basis review, where fundamental rights are threatened. 
See Speiser v. Randell, 357 U.S. 513, 528–29 (1958) (applying heightened 
scrutiny to statutes restraining free speech). 
237. See Wilner, supra note 157, at 1442 (noting that this deferential schema 
is problematic and arguing that “a federal court should not defer to a state 
court decision unless it is unaccompanied by an opinion that actually discusses 
the federal claim.”). 
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rights. Though the Court has shifted away from applying Chevron 
deference and rationality review,238 it has increased the level of AEDPA 
deference owed to state courts.239 This is not just deference; it is “acqui-
escence.”240 
This tremendous burden could contribute significantly to a Suspen-
sion Clause challenge for several reasons. First, it prevents individuals 
from vindicating their federal rights, even where a violation clearly occ-
urred. Because AEDPA forces federal courts to defer to decisions that 
may not exist,241 that do not consider new evidence that validates a 
claim,242 or that was just plain wrong;243 many petitioner’s voices will 
never be heard.244 As one federal judge pointed out, denying a petitioner 
“the opportunity to present all [his] federal claims in federal court” 
amounts to an “unambiguous” suspension of the writ.245 Moreover, if a 
petitioner is held in prison in violation of his constitutional or federal 
rights or if he is held for a crime he did not commit, “[w]hether it was 
reasonable for a state court to misapprehend the dictates of the Consti-
tution in a particular case hardly seems relevant . . . .”246 
Second, habeas corpus no longer acts as a check on the state crim-
inal justice system. Instead, federal judges must “stand by in impotent 
silence,” even if it is apparent that the state criminal process contained 
 
238. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015) (applying heightened 
standard of review for statutes that infringe on fundamental rights); United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001) (explaining that agency letters 
do not get deference because they do not go through notice and comment). 
239. Biale, supra note 2, at 1361–73. 
240. Ritter, supra note 24, at 76–77 (explaining that “[c]ourteous respect or regard 
(or deference) requires that the state court’s decision be recognized and 
evaluated,” not “left uncorrected by a federal court unless it is so wrong that 
not a single fair-minded jurist could agree with it”). 
241. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
242. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
243. Coyle, supra note 5. Justice Sotomayor explains that AEDPA puts federal 
judges in a place where they see an injustice at the state level but are powerless 
to correct it. Id. 
244. Judith L. Ritter, After the Hurricane: The Legacy of the Rubin Carter Case, 
12 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 1, 10–19 (2015) (explaining that former 
middleweight boxing contender, Rubin Carter, spent forty-eight years in prison 
for a crime he did not commit and was released on pre-AEDPA federal habeas 
review; if his claim was reviewed under AEDPA deference, he would have 
died in prison). 
245. Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 628, 635 (9th Cir. 1997) (Nelson, J., 
specially concurring), aff’d, Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998). 
246. Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 859 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., concurring 
specially). 
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“an egregious miscarriage of justice.”247 The fairminded-jurist test pre-
vents federal judges from conducting their own independent assess-
ments and, in doing so, stands in sharp contrast to the flexible habeas 
remedy used at common law. Justice Stevens warned that, without in-
dependent federal review of habeas claims, AEDPA would rob federal 
courts of their Article III duties.248 
C. Clearly Established Law: Deferring to the State’s Interpretation  
of Federal Law 
To overcome AEDPA deference, a petitioner must show that the 
state court unreasonably applied “clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”249 This aspect 
of AEDPA deference works closely with the fairminded-jurist test and 
the reasonableness inquiry; the clearer a given rule of law is, the more 
likely it is that a federal court will conclude that the state court unrea-
sonably misapplied it.250 The Court interprets this amorphous standard 
to mean that “only when a case arises from the same factual scenario 
has the law been clearly established.”251 
In Williams v. Taylor,252 the Court stated that the phrase “clearly 
established” refers only to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this 
Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.”253 
The Court further elaborated on this in several cases.254 In Carey v. 
 
247. Kozinski, supra note 5, at xli. 
248. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378–90 (2000). Justice Stevens articulated 
an alternative theory on a way to apply AEDPA deference to preserve some 
independent review for federal judges, yet raise the bar from de novo review. 
Id. (arguing that AEDPA’s unclear language did not “establish ‘a body of 
rigid rules’” by which federal courts are unable to review the content of a 
habeas petition, but rather it “express[ed] a ‘mood’ that the Federal Judiciary 
must respect”). 
249. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218–19 (1996). 
250. Ursula Bentele, The Not So Great Writ: Trapped in the Narrow Holdings of 
Supreme Court Precedents, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 741, 747–54 (2010). 
251. Id. at 742 (quotation marks omitted); see also Bentele, supra note 6, at 37 
(arguing that one harmful consequence of this is that “interpretation of the 
provisions of the Constitution designed to ensure the fairness of criminal 
convictions and sentences is placed entirely in the hands of the Supreme 
Court, with the lower federal courts playing virtually no role”). 
252. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
253. Id. at 412. Justice Stevens pointed out that the majority’s statement here was 
itself “a somewhat ironic dictum.” Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 78 (2006) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
254. See, e.g., Knowles v. Mirzayance 556 U.S. 111, 120–22 (2009) (holding the 
Court had not clearly established that trial counsel’s abandonment of the 
defendant’s “only defense” was ineffective assistance of counsel because “[t]his 
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Musladin,255 the petitioner argued that the state court violated his right 
to due process and a fair trial because the victim’s family and friends 
wore buttons with photographs of the victim’s face during the trial.256 
He relied mostly on Estelle v. Williams,257 where the Court held that a 
state cannot “compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dress-
ed in identifiable prison clothes,”258 to assert the principle that trial 
courts may not allow “impermissible factors” to affect the fairness of a 
defendant’s trial.259 The Court denied the writ and explained that its 
previous cases dealt only with “state-sponsored courtroom practices” 
and that whether “private-actor courtroom conduct” can deprive a de-
fendant of a fair trial is “an open question in our jurisprudence.”260 But 
none of the Court’s previous cases suggested “that it should matter 
whether the State or an individual may be to blame for some objection-
able sight.”261 And the Court has long stood by the principle that 
“[t]rials must be free from a coercive or intimidating atmosphere.”262 
Keeping with the trend, the Court interprets this piece of Section 
2254(d) in a way that precludes federal courts from applying federal 
law. The concept of law includes more than just narrow, fact-specific 
holdings; it includes principles that must “provide guidance for lawyers 
and judges in future cases.”263 Because of the “rarity and idiosyncrasy 
of direct review of criminal cases by the Supreme Court,” federal courts 
are forced to resist their obligation to apply federal law.264 Moreover, 
 
Court has never established anything akin to the Court of Appeals’ ‘nothing 
to lose’ standard”); Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 12426 (2008) (“Our 
precedents do not clearly hold that counsel’s participation by speakerphone 
should be treated as a ‘complete denial of counsel,’ on par with total absence.”); 
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 478 (2007) (holding that the state court 
did not unreasonably apply federal law and explaining that, despite the long-
standing Strickland standard, “we have never addressed” any situations “in 
which a client interferes with counsel’s efforts to present mitigating evidence 
to a sentencing court”). 
255. 549 U.S. 70 (2006). 
256. Id. at 72–73. 
257. 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
258. Id. at 512. 
259. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 75. 
260. Id. at 76. 
261. Id. at 82 (Souter, J., concurring). 
262. Id. at 80 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
263. Id. at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Ronald Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously 22–39 (1978) (arguing that legal rights and obligations 
include “principles,” which are “requirement[s] of justice or fairness or some 
other dimension of morality”). 
264. Bentele, supra note 250, at 743, 762–63. 
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federal courts cannot prevent state courts from subjecting criminal 
defendants to an unlawful criminal process—the function given to the 
federal government by the Suspension Clause—so long as any state 
misconduct does not fall squarely within the facts of a previous Supreme 
Court case. Additionally, it seems both odd and fundamentally unfair 
to apply a “clearly established law” standard, used only to protect pub-
lic officials in civil lawsuits, to a criminal proceeding. Using this stand-
ard to protect the state, which is not on trial, prevents petitioners from 
fully realizing their constitutional rights in the criminal process—again, 
the precise evil that the writ of habeas corpus is designed to prevent. 
V. Distinguishing AEDPA’s Suspension Wall  
from Past Cases 
Not long after Congress enacted AEDPA, litigators and scholars 
began arguing that Section 2254(d)(1) unconstitutionally suspended the 
writ of habeas corpus.265 Not surprisingly, people were taken aback by 
the drastic changes, so criminal defense attorneys and professors threw 
as many arguments into the mix as possible.266 Those claims failed for 
three practical reasons. First, the Supreme Court had not yet construct-
ed the statute into a “twisted labyrinth of deliberately crafted legal 
obstacles.”267 Second, the Court had not yet embraced the more flexible, 
functional approach to the Suspension Clause.268 Third, litigators did 
not give the Suspension Clause challenge the attention it deserves, par-
tially because they did not yet have the tools they needed.269 
 
265. See Poulson, supra note 32, at 395–399 (discussing how the AEDPA weakens 
the writ of habeas corpus); Woolley, supra note 29, at 432–40 (analyzing the 
policy objections to broad deference under AEDPA and considering possible 
alternatives). 
266. Interview with Michael Benza, Senior Instructor in Law, Case Western Reserve 
Univ. Sch. of Law, Death Penalty Defense Attorney, in Cleveland, Ohio (Oct. 
12, 2015) (“When AEDPA was first enacted, everyone thought, ‘Oh no, the 
world is coming to an end!’ Then, everyone calmed down for a while after 
Williams. We thought, ‘Okay, this isn’t so bad after all.’ Now, after Harrington 
and Pinholster, we are all back to thinking that the world is coming to an end.”). 
267. Reinhardt, supra note 5, at 1220. Harrington v. Richter and Cullen v. Pinholster 
were each decided in 2011. 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011); 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). 
268. See, e.g., Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1122 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining 
to answer the question of “whether the Suspension Clause creates an individual 
right or sets a congressional limit, a point of recent disagreement in the 
D.C. Circuit”) (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 993 (D.C. Cir. 
2007)). As Parts III.A and III.C explain, the Court in Boumediene took a 
functional approach to determine the writ’s constitutional scope and decided 
that the Suspension Clause does guarantee an individual right. 
269. See, e.g., Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 874 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Almost as an 
afterthought, and apparently for the first time on appeal, Green argues that 
this limitation unconstitutionally constricts the habeas jurisdiction of the 
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The Fourth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and Ninth Circuit each reject-
ed the suspension argument for the same reasons: Congress has the 
power to alter federal court jurisdiction over habeas corpus. In Lindh 
v. Murphy,270 the Seventh Circuit reasoned, firstly, that “to alter the 
standards on which writs issue is not to ‘suspend’ the privilege.”271 
Secondly, collateral review of habeas petitions is subject to Congression-
al control; it is not within the constitutional scope of the writ.272 Judge 
Easterbrook asserted that “[t]he Suspension Clause is not a ratchet”; it 
does not “forbid[] every contraction of the powers bestowed by Congress 
in 1885.”273  
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit reasoned in Green v. French274 that 
the AEDPA’s requirements are “entirely ordinary and unexceptionable” 
and that it “represents a modest congressional alteration” of the writ.275 
And in Crater v. Galaza,276 the Ninth Circuit explained that although 
the AEDPA “markedly reduces” the availability of habeas corpus, it 
merely amounts to a “constraint on granting relief,” not a suspension 
of that relief.277 Numerous district courts have followed this reasoning.278 
Petitioners can successfully distinguish their claims from these 
previous cases by arguing, firstly, that Congress does not have unlimit-
ed power to define federal court jurisdiction over habeas, as Lyndh sug-
gested. Boumediene established that the Suspension Clause provides 
something resembling an individual right that acts as an external limit-
ation on Congress’s power.279 Congress does not have the power to in-
fringe upon the constitutional scope of the writ.280 So if petitioners can 
show that the right to the writ includes either meaningful review   
federal courts . . . .”); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 867 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(“Almost as an afterthought . . . .”). 
270. 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996). 
271. Id. at 867. 
272. Id. at 867–68. 
273. Id. at 868. 
274. 143 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1998). 
275. Id. at 875. 
276. 491 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2007). 
277. Id. at 1122, 1125. 
278. See, e.g., Wright v. Martin, No. 14–CV–211–JHP–FHM, 2014 WL 5431199, 
(N.D. Okla. Oct. 24, 2014); Alcarez-Guerrero v. Ryan, No. CV–10–750–TUC–
JGZ (JR), 2013 WL 5498247 (D. Ariz. Oct. 1, 2013); Bowling v. Parker, 
882 F.Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. Ky. 2012); Norris v. Warden, NCI, No. 2:08–cv–
732, 2010 WL 883847 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (all upholding AEDPA’s 
constitutionality). 
279. See supra Part III.A. 
280. See supra Part III.A. 
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or federal review, then they can likely demonstrate that Section 
2254(d)(1) infringes upon that right. 
Secondly, Section 2254(d)(1) can no longer plausibly be described 
as a “modest congressional alteration” of the writ or a mere “modify-
cation.” Rather, it is a drastic shift in habeas review that is “impossible 
to meet.”281 The standard contains three layers of deference, each one 
of which substantially increases the likelihood that a petitioner will 
never obtain full and fair review of his federal claims and that his voice 
will never be heard by any court.282 Further, Boumediene recognized 
that the writ’s constitutional scope is informed by the judiciary’s func-
tion to check government abuses.283 But AEDPA deference renders fed-
eral courts powerless to correct injustice and obliges them to let state 
abuses go unnoticed.284 The Suspension Clause is not a “ratchet,” but 
nor is it barren of the life the framers breathed into it. 
Conclusion 
For twenty years, AEDPA has buried habeas petitioners behind its 
walls, frustrated judges, and exacerbated society’s brokenness. Chall-
engers can now forcefully argue that the Suspension Clause guarantees 
habeas petitioners a right to meaningful federal review of their federal 
claims. They can argue that Section 2254(d)(1)’s three layers of defer-
ence set a near impossible standard that substantially reduces a pet-
itioner’s chances of receiving meaningful review in either state court or 
federal court. Further, AEDPA deference deprives judges of their duty 
to check state courts and to apply federal law in its entirety. The 
Suspension Clause challenge no longer needs to be an “afterthought.” 
Instead, challengers can use the Court’s seemingly contentious prece-
dents to force political action and to publicly expose AEDPA for what 
it is—“a cruel, unjust, and unnecessary law”285 that ignorantly bites 
into this country’s most cherished principles. It is time to bring down 
th wall. 
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